Rethinking Modern Warfare: Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict

A recent analysis highlights the complexities of modern warfare, emphasizing that advancements in technology alone do not define a new approach to combat. Gen. (ret.) Sir Nick Carter, a distinguished former leader of the British military, reflects on his experiences and the lessons learned from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. He cautions against overly simplistic interpretations that focus solely on technological innovations, such as drones, while neglecting the broader context of warfare.

Carter recalls a significant moment from his military education—a battlefield tour at the Somme in 2001, led by the late Richard Holmes. Holmes narrated the historical evolution of warfare, particularly the introduction of the tank during World War I. Initially designed to support infantry, the tank’s true potential was realized only when integrated with artillery, engineers, and air support. This concept of combined arms maneuver proved crucial in achieving victories during the 100-day campaign of World War I and the blitzkrieg tactics of World War II.

As the conflict in Ukraine continues, Carter notes that it provides valuable insights for military strategists. However, he warns that focusing solely on the technological aspects—especially drone warfare—could lead to misguided conclusions. The current battlefield dynamics, which exhibit characteristics reminiscent of World War I, indicate that technology alone has not produced decisive outcomes. Instead, the conflict has resulted in a stalemate, with drones substituting for capabilities that Ukraine lacks.

The integration of technology into existing military structures is vital for NATO forces to adapt effectively. Carter emphasizes that lasting change will occur only through the incorporation of new technologies within established doctrines and operational concepts. He argues that NATO should not simply replicate Ukraine’s approach but should consider a comprehensive strategy that includes operational analysis, research and development, and extensive training.

Carter points out that the lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War highlight the importance of understanding the unique characteristics of each conflict. The notion that drones signify a new era of warfare is misleading. While they have proven effective in specific scenarios, they cannot replace traditional military capabilities such as tanks or infantry. Instead, the future of warfare lies in the effective integration of new systems with legacy platforms, ensuring a coherent and agile response to evolving threats.

The evolution of military strategy requires a cultural shift within NATO forces. Carter reflects on his own experiences during the 1980s, when the British Army transitioned to the AirLand Battle doctrine. This shift was driven by the lessons learned from conflicts like the Vietnam War and the Yom Kippur War. The focus moved from mere attrition to maneuver warfare, emphasizing decentralized command and the ability to seize fleeting opportunities.

For NATO to achieve a new way of warfare, it must prioritize the development of doctrine and operational concepts over technological gadgetry. Carter urges military leaders to engage in systematic processes of research, experimentation, and training, akin to those that have shaped successful military transformations in the past. This includes evaluating the potential of autonomous systems and their integration into existing military frameworks.

Carter concludes that true innovation in warfare will arise from a collaborative effort among armed forces, academia, and industry. As NATO countries navigate the challenges of modern conflict, understanding the implications of technology within the context of doctrine and culture will be crucial. The future of warfare is not solely about adopting new technologies; it is about envisioning and implementing a comprehensive strategy that reflects the complexities of contemporary military engagements.